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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
This possibility was not considered by the court since it gave
judgment in favor of the vendor in this case on another ground.
IV. TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
TORTS
Landowner's Liability to Trespassing Children
The extent of a landowner's duty to protect trespassing child-
ren from the danger of drowning in a pond or other body of
water maintained on his premises cannot be easily, defined. It
is admittedly difficult to devise adequate protective measures
against such risk without frequently imposing heavy financial
burdens on the proprietor or seriously interfering with his effec-
tive use of his own property. This is particularly true in Louisiana
where the topography of the countryside makes the use of canals
and other drainage facilities a necessity. Furthermore, in this state
there is an obvious overspreading risk of unavoidable drowning
in the many natural bodies of water such as bayous, swamps,,
and rivers which characterize our terrain. For this reason, the
peril of drowning is one to which the child populace of this state
would continue to be exposed even if all man-made bodies of
water were adequately safeguarded.
The difficulty of working out a compromise formula which
would operate fairly for both landowner and trespassing children
has induced many courts to close the door to recovery by an-
nouncing that the "attractive nuisance" doctrine (which would be
the springboard for recovery in such situations) does not apply
to ponds and other bodies of water.' In the past the Louisiana
courts have consistently given judgment for the defendant in
cases of this type.2  Recently, however, in the case, Saxton v.
Plum Orchards, Incorporated,3 the supreme court was faced with
a tragic occurrence which convinced it that simple rule-of-thumb
action denying recovery is too harsh in the drowning cases. The
facts of the Plum Orchards case indicate that in 1942 defendant
had developed several acres of property in New Orleans as a sub-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See cases collected (1925) 36 A.L.R. 224; (1926) 45 A.L.R. 992; (1928) 53
A.L.R. 1354; (1929) 60 A.L.R. 1453.
2. McKenna v. City of Shreveport, 133 So. 524 (La. App. 2d cir. 1931);
Peters v. Town of Ruston, 167 So. 491 (La. App. 2d cir. 1936); Fincher v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 143 La. 164, 78 So. 433 (1918).
3. 215 La. 378, 40 So.(2d) 791 (1949).
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division and had leased about a hundred houses thereon to the
public. In order to supply itself with dirt and also probably to
drain the area and to provide sewerage, defendant had excavated
a place two hundred feet long and about twenty-five feet wide.
This hole had filled with water and was left standing at a location
less than a hundred and fifty feet from many of the dwellings
leased out by defendant. The fact that it had become filled
with water deprived it of its usefulness as a drainage and sewer-
age facility. Plaintiff was one of defendant's tenants. His four
year old child was drowned in this excavation. The court was
obviously impressed by the high degree of danger involved and
particularly the comparative ease with which defendant might
have obviated the risk by removing the useless peril entirely.
It allowed recovery to the parents under .the attractive nuisance
doctrine.
It is interesting to note that the court managed to turn the
earlier case of Fincher v. Railroad4 (decided in 1918) to its advan-
tage, although the Fincher case was in fact almost indistinguish-
able from the present controversy and had resulted in a judgment
for defendant. In both cases the danger from the body of water
could easily have been obviated by the proprietor; in each case
the pool served no useful purpose; in each the pool was easily ac-
cessible to children and was attractive to them. The cases were
distinguishable in only one respect: in the Fincher case the body
of water was not visible until the child had already trespassed
upon the property, while in the Plum Orchards case the pond
could be seen from the adjacent highway. This distinction was
noted in the Plum Orchards case, although it is not clear that the
court intended to emphasize it. It used language in the Fincher
case, rather, to indicate that a pond of water may under some
circumstances be classified as an attractive nuisance.
Thus there remains an important question: Does the Louis-
iana court intend to admit that there is a duty of care toward tres-
passing children with reference to bodies of water which are
within eye-shot of the property line, so that recovery can be allow-
ed when circumstances show that justice demands relief, and
does it at the same time intend to grant arbitrary immunity for
water dangers so long as they cannot be seen from outside the
land, even though their presence is known to children and their
allurement is obvious?
This distinction between perils which are visible from out-
4. 143 La. 164, 78 So. 433 (1918).
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side the property and those which are not was first drawn in the
United States Supreme Court by Justice Holmes in the case, Britt
v. United Chemical and Zinc Company.5 Strangely enough, this
case also involved the death of a child in a body of water. How-
ever, the victim was poisoned. The pond was an abandoned res-
ervoir which had formerly been used in connection with defen-
dant's chemical plant and had been left with substantial quanti-
ties of sulphuric acid in it. It could not be seen until after the
premises were entered, although its presence was a matter of
common knowledge in the neighborhood. The negligence was in-
excusable and the danger obvious. Yet defendant escaped under
the fictional distinction drawn by the eminent jurist, whose de-
cisions in tort cases have been regarded as notoriously deficient
when compared with his output in other fields." The rule of the
Britt case was followed for a while in a few other jurisdictions,
but it has generally been repudiated and it was deliberately re-
jected in the Restatement of Torts.'
The writer prefers to regard the Plum Orchards case as rep-
resenting a new and more liberal approach to the attractive nuis-
ance doctrine as applied to artificial bodies of water. Certainly it
is the first Louisiana case in which recovery has been allowed for
the drowning of a trespassing child. It seems likely that the su-
preme court preferred to advert to the Britt doctrine merely as
a means of avoiding direct overruling of the more timid decision
in the Fincher case. Such is often the way of courts.
Duty with Reference to Parked Aircraft
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently applied ordinary
negligence principles to a collision of airplanes on the ground.8
Although our state has not adopted the Uniform State Law for
Aeronautics," the approach adopted by the supreme court is the
same as under Section 6 of that act.' 0 The facts of the case showed
5. 258 U.S. 268, 65 L.Ed. 446, 42 S.Ct. 299 (1921).
6. See, for instance, the much-criticized opinion in Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 48 S.Ct. 24, 72 L.Ed. 167, 56 A.L.R. 645 (1927).
7. Hudson, the Turntable Cases in the Federal Courts (1923) 36 Harv. L.
Rev. 826; Wilson, Limitations on the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine (1923) 1
N.C. L. Rev. 162. A.L.I., Restatement of Torts (1934) § 339.
The highly artificial basis of the rule of the Britt case is the theory that
the child cannot recover without showing he was lured or "invited" upon the
premises by the dangerous thing which injured him. If he entered without
being lured and saw the attractive thing only thereafter, he must be regarded
as a trespasser toward whom no duty is owed.
8. Southern Air Transport v. Gulf Airways, Inc., 215 La. 366, 40 So.(2d)
787 (1949).
9. 9 Uniform Laws § 6 (1923); 1941 U.S. Av. Rev. 341.
10. Section 6 reads as follows: "The liability of the owner of one aircraft
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that defendant's plane was carried two hundred feet along the
ground by a severe wind and was thrown against plaintiff's ship,
causing the damage complained of. The testimony indicated
that about a week before the accident defendant's pilot had park-
ed the plane at the New Orleans airport and probably had set the
brakes and blocked the wheels. However, it appeared that im-
mediately after the accident the wheels were free and no blocks
were in evidence. It also seemed that the pilot was at the airport
at the time of the accident, although he was not in the immediate
vicinity of the crash. Although several competing explanations of
the accident were available, all pointed toward negligence on the
part of defendant's agent. If the plane was safe when left, as
contended by defendant, a reasonable inspection to determine
the continued adequacy of the safeguards during the interim
would have revealed that the plane had become insecure. The
court was willing to find that a failure to maintain some sort of
periodic inspection was carelessness, particularly in view of the
fact that there was advance notice of the approaching storm.
It is interesting to note that in cases of ground accident, at
least, courts have shown little disposition to impose an extraordi-
nary liability upon the operator of an airplane. In the instant
case there was free resort to prevailing practices in parking and
maintaining planes, which were established by the testimony of
other operators. This attitude was confirmed in a Wisconsin
case" involving a land collision of planes where the supreme
court reversed a plaintiff's judgment because the trial judge had
instructed the jury that the defendant was bound to exercise "the
highest ,degree of care."
Inducing Breach of Contract
The supreme court has recently reaffirmed the position con-
sistently adopted in this state that the deliberate inducement of a
breach of contract is not a recognized wrong. 12 This has been the
view in Louisiana since 1902,'1 despite the fact that a cause of ac-
tion for this kind of hurt is recognized in France, Germany, and
in most common law jurisdictions. 4
to the owner of another aircraft, or to aeronauts or passengers on either air-
craft, for damages caused by collision on land or in the air, shall be deter-
mined by the rules of law applicable to torts on land."
11. Greunke v. North American Airways Co., 201 Wis. 565, 230 N.W. 618
(1930).
12. Templeton v. Interstate Electric Co., 214 La. 334, 37 So.(2d) 809 (1948).
13. Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (1902).
14. A.L.I., Restatement of Torts (1934) § 766. Prosser, A Handbook on the




Our supreme court, like the courts in many other states, has
insisted in the past on hogtying itself with the arbitrary rule
that failure to drive within the range of lights during nighttime
is negligence (or contributory negligence) per se.15 This rule
has worked particular hardship in cases where the defendant has
obstructed the highway at night causing injury to the oncoming
plaintiff motorist who crashes into the defendant's obstruction.
In these days of fast moving night traffic the highway obstruc-
tor is a particularly grievous offender and, as between himself
and the victim who has violated a purely arbitrary rule requiring
him to drive within the range of his illuminated vision, it would
seem that the obstructor should pay. However, the arbitrary rule
referred to has the effect of relieving the obstructing defendant
of liability. In some states the courts have adopted the more
flexible position that the night driver need only use reasonable
care commensurate with the occasion.16 In these jurisdictions
failure to keep within the range of the lights is regarded only
as one factor to be weighed in determining whether the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence. In states where the courts
have adopted the arbitrary position that prevails in Louisiana, the
rule has been diluted with numerous exceptions, so that its use-
fulness is doubtful.'" The tendency everywhere is to seek to
minimize the shortcomings of the night driver when he seeks to
recover from the person who is guilty of the more serious offense
of obstructing the public highway.
Recently in Dodge, v. Bituminous Casualty, Corporation,5 a
case where the fact situation was fairly typical of those described
above, the supreme court launched itself into a daring attack upon
the problem. Rule 15 of Louisiana Act 21 of 1932 imposes the
common duty of installing warning lights around a vehicle park-
ed upon the public highway at night. The following interesting
paragraph appears in this section: " . . . it shall be the duty of
the owner or driver of any such vehicle to remove the same as
soon as possible and until removed to protect traffic from same
at his responsibility." The supreme court appeared to announce
15. Sexton v. Stiles, 130 So. 821, 82'7 (La. App. 2d cir. 1930); Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. Saia, 173 So. 537 (La. App. Orl. 1937.) See generally
Comments (1935) 23 Cal. L. Rev. 498, (1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 877.
16. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation
(1936) 3 Law and Contemp. Prob. 476, 479.
17. See, for example, Gaiennie v. Cooperative Produce Co., 196 La. 417, 199
So. 377 (1940); Hanno v. Motor Freight Lines, 134 So. 317 (La. App. 1st cir.
1931); Stafford v. Nelson Bros., 130 So. 234 (La. App. 1st cir. 1930).
18. 214 La. 1031, 39 So.(2d) 720 (1949).
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in what seems unmistakable language that one who violates this
statute cannot escape liability because of the claimed contribu-
tory negligence of the oncoming plaintiff who collides with a
vehicle parked in violation of the section. Said the court, "The
responsibility to protect traffic is fixed by statute. The liability
for any injury or damage is therefore fixed upon the de-
fendant."'19 Certainly dissenting Justice McCaleb so interpreted
the opinion, for he expressly took issue with the conclusion.
However, in a per curiam opinion on rehearing the court abjured
its intention to make so drastic a pronouncement. It insisted,
instead, that the evidence failed to show that the oncoming
plaintiff was in fact guilty of contributory negligence.
Perhaps the court was wise to announce a retreat. Sound
judgment would dictate dealing strictly with the obstructor where
the victim's only fault was his failure to meet the technical re-
quirement of driving within the range of vision. However, the
rule suggested in the original opinion would preclude the defense
of contributory negligence even if the oncoming plaintiff were
guilty of serious inattention and could have avoided the obstruc-
tion with ease. We have here another illustration of the old
adage that bad poison invites dangerous antidotes.
It is interesting to note that although only three other traffic
cases were handed down by the supreme court last year, all in-
volved accidents arising out of efforts to make left turns, and in
each instance the collision was between the turning vehicle and
an overtaking car which approached from the rear. Two of these
cases deserve brief mention here:
Cassar v. Mansfield Lumber Company20 presented a situa-
tion where the driver and occupant of the overtaking vehicle
were injured when defendant's truck ahead suddenly undertook
a left turn without warning on the open highway. The defense
was contributory negligence of the driver of the overtaking car in
attempting to pass at an excessive rate of speed. The court con-
ceded the contributory negligence, but it found that the truck-
driver was aware of the vehicle approaching from behind at a
high speed when he attempted to negotiate the turn. Thus the
defendant was aware of the peril and could have avoided it at
a time when excessive speed had placed the overtaking driver
in a helpless position. The notion of "discovered peril" Was ap-
19. 214 La. 1031, 1038, 39 So.(2d) 720, 723.
20. 41 So. (2d) 209 (La. 1949).
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plied and recovery was allowed the negligent victim and his pas-
sengers.
The owner of the overtaking vehicle (an ambulance) was
plaintiff again in the next case, Holabaugh-Seale Funeral Home,
Incorporated v. Standard Accident Insurance Company.21 The
driver of the truck negotiating the left turn was charged with
negligence in attempting to turn without giving an adequate sig-
nal, as in the Cassar case. The defense again was contributory
negligence by the driver of the overtaking ambulance. He was
charged with inattention and also with attempting to pass at an
intersection in violation of the rules of the road. Here, however,
unlike the picture in Cassar's case, it did not appear that the de-
fendant's driver was aware of the approach of the ambulance
from behind-although it is clear that a reasonable lookout would
have revealed the danger. Hence the court was faced with a
situation where there was negligence on both sides and simple
inadvertence was chargeable to each driver. Neither had a sup-
erior opportunity to avoid the mishap, and the court properly
allowed the risk to lie where it had fallen, and denied recovery.
The third case, Pap one v. Cotton Trade Warehouse, Incorporat-
ed,22 depended entirely on a dispute of fact, and is not reviewed
here.
WORKIEN'S COMPNSATION
Any person claiming compensation for the death of a worker
is required to show dependency upon the deceased at the time of
the accident and death. 23 However, in case of the wife and minor
children it is sufficient to show that the claimant was living with
deceased at the time of accident and death. When this is shown,
the claimant is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent
upon the deceased.24 Up until 1926 actual dependency could be in-
ferred from the fact that claimant needed the support of the
victim and had a reasonable expectation of receiving contribu-
tions from him, even though no actual support has been forth-
coming.25 This rule had led to complications in cases where the
claimant was the parent of the deceased. If the deceased had left
the parental roof, it was normally to be expected that he would
establish his own family unit and would not be able to support
21. 41 So.(2d) 212 (La. 1949).
22. 41 So.(2d) 505 (La. 1949).
23. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 8(1) (E) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4398].
24. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 8(2) (A) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4398].
25. Gregory v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 151 La. 228, 91 So. 717 (1922).
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parents with whom he no longer lived, and compensation should
not be allowable to such parents except under unusual circum-
stances. Yet the rule announced above enabled parents to suc-
cessfully claim compensation on the mere expectation that the
deceased would have made contribution toward their support if
he had continued to live. In order to correct this situation the
legislature added to Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act the following provision: "The mere expectation or hope of
future contributions to the support of an alleged dependent by an
employee shall not constitute proof of dependency as a fact."
Recently in Haynes v. Loffland Brothers' Company26 suit was
instituted by the former wife of a deceased employee who was
killed while in defendant's service. She claimed compensation
on behalf of their minor child. The mother had divorced deceased
several years earlier, and custody of the child had been awarded
to her. Under the terms of the decree the deceased had been or-
dered to pay to the mother for the support of the child $15 per
month. This provision of the decree was consistently ignored by
the deceased, and several months before the fatal accident de-
ceased was indicted by a Texas grand jury for non-support. This
indictment had no effect.
The supreme court denied the claim for compensation be-
cause of the failure to show dependency on the part of the child.
Since the child was not living with deceased at the time of ac-
cident and death he could not rely on the conclusive presumption
of dependency and was required to prove dependency in fact.
The court felt constrained to apply the quoted portion of the act
set forth above, and since no contributions had been made to
the child's support by the father, the hope that support would be
forthcoming was not enough, even though this hope was rein-
forced with a court order and a grand jury indictment.
In Hughes v. Enloe27 the supreme court reaffirmed a propo-
sition which it had announced repeatedly in several decisions
during past years. Claimant had accidentally lost several fingers
from one hand. The court of appeal allowed compensation for
specific injury under Section 8 (d) of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, although claimant was disabled from doing work of the
same reasonable character he had performed prior to the acci-
dent. On appeal the supreme court stated that when there is
disability the disability provisions [Sections 8 (a) and 8 (b)] pre-
26. 215 La. 280, 40 So.(2d) 243 (1949).
27. 214 La. 538, 38 So.(2d) 225 (1948).
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vail over the less generous provisions for specific losses in Sec-
tion 8 (d) .28
V. INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
In the field of insurance, some interesting cases were before
the court during the 1948-1949 session.
The troublesome question of whether the defense of lack of
coverage is available despite an incontestability clause in the
policy and Act 140 of 19381 was up for decision in Gordon v. Unity
Life Insurance Company.2 The court ruled that the incontestabil-
ity clause in question did not operate to extend coverage to a risk
excluded under the policy and specifically excepted from the op-
eration of the clause, that is, death by venereal disease. It dis-
tinguished the earlier cases of Bernier v. Pacific Mutual Life In-
surance Company of California3 and Garrell v. Good Citizens Mu-
tual Benefit Association, Incorporated.4  Justice McCaleb filed
a persuasive concurring opinion in which he argued that the Gar-
rell case had incorrectly applied the Bernier case and that the
court should have taken advantage of the opportunity to correct
it. The basic holding that the incontestability clause and Act 140
of 1938 do not relate to risks excluded from coverage, unless an
ambiguity is created by the. wording of the policy, was concurred
in by the whole court.
Whether the insurer should have credited to certain insurance
policies dividends declared for the year 1942 and payable on poli-
cy anniversaries in 1943, "provided premiums shall have been
paid in full to such anniversaries and the policies are then in full
force" was the question in Oil Well Supply Company v. New
York Life Insurance Company.' By crediting the dividends, the
life of the policies would have been extended beyond the death
of insured.
The court found that the 1943 anniversary date of each poli-
cy was, in keeping with an election by the assured at the time of
28. This rule was conclusively established in Robichaux v. Realty Opera-
tors, 195 La. 70, 196 So. 23 (1940). See generally The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-Torts and Workmen's Compensation
(1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 248, 253 et seq.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4134.4.
2. 215 La. 25, 39 So.(2d) 812 (1949).
3. 173 La. 1078, 139 So. 629 (1932).
4. 204 La. 871, 16 So.(2d) 463 (1943).
5. 214 La. 772, 38 So.(2d) 777 (1949).
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